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Abstract: In this paper, I explore Dharmakirti’s claim that when it comes to 
imperceptible objects, our cognition is unable to determine whether they exist or do 
not exist. Dharmakirti was arguably convinced that any attempt to account for 
nonexistent objects will inevitably introduce another set of valid cognition and this 
consequently leads to the fallacies of infinite regress and reification. Given his 
critique of his contemporaries’ accounts of nonexistents, it is understandably clear 
that Dharmakirti declines offering ample explanations on the logical operations of 
nonexistents. Instead, he resorts to doctrinal authority to explicate the complexity 
that comes with the notions like rebirth and mind continua. Between the dilemma 
that arises from the tension between his commitments to both anti-realist Buddhist 
soteriology and realist epistemology, Dharmakirti chose the former. Alexius 
Meinong, on the other hand, develops a theory of objects that caters to a whole 
range of objects, including nonexistent and impossible objects, without committing 
to their ontological status. I argue in this paper that Dharmakirti’s epistemology 
will be enriched by Meinongian frameworks in accounting for nonexistents. 
Through Meinongian accounts of nonexistent, the tension between dual 
commitments in Buddhist soteriology and epistemology can be solved. Likewise, 
Meinong will be obviously advantaged to take heed of Dharmakirti’s critical 
reviews on the methodological limitations on account of nonexistents. In a nutshell, 
my comparative study of Dharmakirti’s and Meinongian position on nonexistents 
helps us appreciate two vital philosophical perspectives that may enhance our 
understanding over the critical philosophical and epistemological issues facing 
them. 
 
Introduction 
 
Dharmakirti (c. 660 AD) is recognized as one of the most abstruse philosophical 
thinkers of his time. His writings provide the guiding insights into Buddhist and 
Indian epistemology that influence the Indo-Tibetan studies of logic for many 
centuries. To date, Dharmakirti’s works are still being pursued and form parts of the 
core curriculum in many Buddhist monasteries in India and the West. My study here 
will focus on Dharmakirti’s view on non-cognition of imperceptible objects and his 
critical views over the accounts of nonexistents by his contemporaries. To provide 
some background, however, I firstly intend to shed light on how Dharmakirti makes 
sense of cognizable and non-cognizable objects and his theory of epistemology and its 
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constraints in brief. Following that, I am going to go through one of the important 
issue in the interpretation of Dharmakirti’s incoherent accounts. The subsequent part 
will address Dharmakirti’s reasons for his skepticism over the accounts of 
nonexistents by his interlocutors. He was arguably convinced that any attempt to 
provide explanations to nonexistent objects will inevitably introduce another set of 
valid cognition and this consequently leads to the fallacies of infinite regress and 
reification. Dharmakirti’s view, however, is not without implications. The research in 
this paper is most rewarding when the views of Dharmakirti’s is compared to those of 
Meinong, an Austrian philosopher of early 20
th
 century, whose Theory of Objects 
seems to be able to account for nonexistents without committing to ontology, a 
concern that both Dharmakirti and Meinong subscribe to. I attempt to apply some of 
the Meinongian solutions to Dharmakirti’s non-accessible object and observe how far 
such application can be stretched, the outcome of which leads to promising research 
opportunities in the future, especially with possible discussions among Neo-
Meinongians and Neo-Dharmakirtians. This paper research is wrapped up with a 
conclusion that outlines some of the salient points of comparison between the two 
approaches to nonexistents and some final note on their implications. 
 
I. Dharmakirti and His Position within the Studies of Indian Logic 
 
The Buddhist logic and epistemology created in India in the 6
th
 and 7
th
 century AD 
was often attributed to two great Buddhist philosophers, namely Dignaga (c. 480-540 
AD) and his philosophical successor, Dharmakirti. The former was one of the first to 
organize the Buddhist theory of pramana, or means of cognition, into a systematic 
thought.  Unlike his contemporaries from the Brahmanic traditions, Dignaga only 
accepts two means of valid cognition, that is, perception and inference. Perception is 
defined by Dignaga as the cognition “that is free from conceptual construction.” 
Perception is inexpressible given it is free from mental fabrication, that is, free from 
“the association of name, genus, etc [with a thing perceived, which results in verbal 
designation of the thing]” (Yao, 2005:131). Dharmakirti agrees with this definition 
but also adds the criterion of “non-erroneous” in his later works. According to Yao 
(Ibid.), for both Dharmakirti and Dignaga, perception is classified into four types, i.e. 
sense perception, mental perception, the self-cognition of all mind and mental 
activities, and the yogic perception. 
1
  
In regards to self-cognition, Dharmakirti remarks: “Just as light is thought to 
illuminate itself while it is illumining because that is its nature, so also does the mind 
know itself.” (Ibid., 20-21) Both Dignaga and Dharmakirti emphasize the primacy of 
the role of self-cognition with regards to functions of memory of mental or physical 
phenomena and perception of what have never been perceived a priori.  
For objects that can’t be perceived directly without conceptual constraint and 
error, reliance on inference is called forth. Inference, however, involves mental 
processing to understand conceptually fabricated objects. Hence, as a mental 
operation, inferential activity is subject to errors. Despite this, it may be instrumental 
as an aid to uncover unknown truth and may lead to causal efficacy (successful effect 
                                                          
1 See Yao 2005:130-132 for a discussion on the controversies over the divergent types of 
perception that Dignaga might have accepted. The sources from China may throw light on this 
disagreement among scholars. In essence, Yao points to the evidence from Chinese source that 
Dignaga accepted four types of perception in has early works. 
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of an action). For this reason, it is considered an epistemological warrant (Lysenko, 
2007:20-21). Each of these instruments of valid cognition, perception and inference, 
has its respective subject matter or bearing. Perception, which attributes immediacy as 
its hall-mark, has bearing on “particulars,” that is, something unique and 
inexpressible. 
2
 Inference, on the other hand, takes conceptualizations and products of 
conceptual fabrications as its objects. These later objects, under inferential activity, 
are labelled under “universals.” 3 The question arises then “what makes an instance of 
perception a piece of knowledge if sense-object contact is not cognitive and 
conceptualization is cognitive but not immediate? The answer to this question can be 
found in the role that self-cognition plays. Self-cognition or self-reflective awareness 
is “a sort of intuitive experience that accompanies all kinds of mental activity, being 
itself free from conceptualization” (Lysenko, 2007:20). It should be added that 
Dignaga and Dharmakirti maintain that their conception of self-cognition is not 
governed by additional cognition or else it will subject to the fallacy of infinite 
regress. 
Following the epistemological system that marks the Sautrantika School, 
Dharmakirti also postulates the reality of mind; self-cognition, on a conventional and 
linguistic level, must be real in order to able to cognize and make sense, the 
implication of which Tillemans pointed out below. 
 
II. Limitations in Dharmakirti’s Epistemology 
 
It is due to the above strands of realism in Dharmakirti that Tillemans charges him 
and his followers as advocates of a variation of “Buddhist metaphysical realism” and 
suggests the following summary and critical reconstructions of Dharmakirti et al’s 
fundamental positions:  
1. Mental and physical aggregates are real entities due to their distinct properties. 
2. The karmic operation of cause and effect occurs between entities of similar 
kinds due to the principle of “like must cause like”; 
3. Due to (1) & (2), the brain and other physical aggregates cannot be the cause 
of the mental and likewise; things of distinct properties can only be auxiliary causes. 
4
 
Tillemans finds Dharmakiriti’s thesis above as unduly problematic as it presupposes 
the existence of continuous minds or “mental states that spans past lives and will also 
(with some rare exceptions) extend to future lives.” (Tillemans, 2016, 203) By 
implication of his tenets above, Dharmakirti runs into the difficulty of accounting for 
plausibility of rebirth, a cardinal theory of Buddhist philosophy in relation to cause 
and effect, and eventually has to resort to the doctrinal explanation. This attempt has 
                                                          
2 See Gupta 2006:245-257 on discussion on how Chandrakirti took issue with Dignaga and 
Dharmakīrti epistemological treatment of this notion. 
3 There was some disagreement among scholars as to what constitute Dignanag’s notion of 
perception. Lysenko differs from Yao by not including sense perception under perception. Her 
argument is that Buddhists, unlike other Indian philosophers, did not see “sense-object contact” 
as the main condition of sense perception. Hence, she reasons “immediacy of pratyaksa 
[perception] is not reduced to any sort of direct sense stimulation.” See Lysenko 2007:21. 
Reading on material on Dharmakīrti and the Tibetan sources by Paul Williams show Yao’s 
interpretation was more preferred. See Williams 2005:119-182. 
4 See Tillemans 2016:203 for a discussion on the weakness of Dharmakīrti’s view vis a vis 
contemporary eliminativist view. 
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inexorably made Dharmakirti choose the fallibilist argument. 
5
 While I may not fully 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
agree with Tillemans that Dharmakirti’s view has implicitly caused a dualist account 
of mind-body causation, given the inconclusive stage of scientific research, I concur 
with Tillemans that Dharmakirti has taken a rather hasty path to argue for doctrinal 
explanation and appeal to authority in Buddha (i.e., “Since the Buddha as ‘a source of 
epistemological knowledge’ said there is rebirth, then we should believe in rebirth”) 
in respect to the notion like rebirth, and this is without reason, and this can also be 
seen when it comes to Dharmakirti’s treatment of nonexistents. As John Dunne 
remarks that given that Dharmakirti stands in between two traditions as a Buddhist 
anti-realist and Epistemological Theorist, in which he needs to uphold that perception 
and inference as valid cognition, his commitments to both “are often in tension” 
(Dunne 2004:46). 
6
  The basic assumptions of the two stances may not always be 
compatible and when there’s disagreement, that is, inconclusive position to account 
for nonexistent objects like rebirth, it is understandably that Dharmakirti would resort 
to appeal to authority in scripture. Secondly, even though Dignaga and Dharmakirti 
carry out a distinctive view on non-cognition of perceptible objects (e.g., “There is no 
pot”) in their epistemological theory, their discussions are more limited to negation of 
perceptible/empirical objects. But, when it comes to the negation of imperceptible 
things (e.g. “Ghosts do not exist”), according to Yao, “Dharmakirti’s admits that his 
theory of non- cognition is not able to deal with this type of negation.” (Yao 
2007:743).  Indeed, Dharmakirti clearly gives his reason skeptical position when it 
comes to the paradox of non-cognition of imperceptibles, which I am going to present 
in the section following next. However, let’s briefly look at one of the important issue 
facing the interpretation of Dharmakirti’s classification of objects of cognition and the 
rationale that nonexistents are not incompatible with his theory, in other words, 
included in the domain of Dharmakirti’s object of cognition. 
 
III. Issue in interpretations of Dharmakirti’s Classification of Nonexistents as Object 
of Cognition 
 
Reading Dharmakirti is not a straightforward task, as in interpreting any Buddhist 
theoretical doctrines or for that matter any piece of complex philosophical works. 
This seems more the case when it concerns Dharmakirti, who apart from employing 
an allegedly difficult style in his original Sanskrit texts, did not give a complete 
explanation of his accounts on how non-entities could be objects of valid cognition. 
As such we often need to rely on commentarial traditions and modern interpretations 
to tie up the loose ends. One of the main issues in interpreting Dharmakirti in relation 
to non-cognition of non-existents is: how can non-cognition be included as an object 
of valid cognition since non-existents themselves are absence of existence and 
seemingly unable to fulfil one of the three criteria of valid cognition? 
                                                          
5 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines fallabilism as: “the epistemological thesis 
that no belief (theory, view, thesis, and so on) can ever be rationally supported or justified in a 
conclusive way. Always, there remains a possible doubt as to the truth of the belief.” See 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/fallibil/. For Tillemans’s argument on Dharmakīrti’s fallabilist account, 
see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dharmakiirti/#RelEth 
6 See Dunne 2004:39 for the disagreements between Buddhist anti realist position and the 
South Asian epistemologists in the discourse on distributed entities.  
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According to Hugon (2011), there are at least two readings regarding 
Dharmakirti’s theory of valid cognition on nonexistents: 
1. “Practicalist reading” in which valid cognition are “primarily oriented towards 
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human activities and aims and hence bear on objects capable of bringing about the 
intended objective.” Under such interpretation at conventional level, there is no place 
for “rabbit’s horns” and “non-existents” as they are not apt to fulfil certain human 
goal or, in the parlance of Buddhist epistemology, they do not have the reliability for 
causal efficacy. 
2. “Alternative reading” where the universal object of cognition includes not only 
the “impermanent” (real existing thing) but also “permanent entities that do not exist 
in reality.” These objects of valid cognition would cover permanent space, ghost, 
horned rabbits and furred turtles. This approach takes its clues from the reading of 
Dharmakirti’s argument in the third chapter of Pramanavartikka. In this alternative 
reading, the validity of cognition is not defined by reliability but considering 
“whether cognition presents the ontological status of its object, that is whether it is 
coherent in the sense of being or being challenged by valid cognition.” (Hugon 
2011:380-381) 
In other words, once an object of non-cognition came to be determined as a 
“target of human interest” after fulfilling all the necessary conditions and without 
being falsified by inference from its indirect relation to reality.  
The alternative reading of Dharmakirti’s position on nonexistents appears 
counterintuitively evident in Pramanaviniscaya though in his other works, there 
seems to be lack of clarity and hence resulting into variations of reading. On the issue 
of compatibility of these interpretations, Hugon (2011) has dealt with extensively in 
his paper, which I am not going to through at length here. 
However, there is no explicit account in Dharmakirti’s works on how non-entities 
are only to be considered in relations to entities, with causal efficacy. Hugon 
suggested that the correspondence principle, substituting reliability based on causal 
efficacy, should involve no causal links when it is applicable to non-existents. This 
suggestion seems coherent with another account of Dharmakirti’s definition of 
existent, whereby “to be causally efficacious, therefore, is ipso facto to be momentary 
and being so, on this account, is clearly the criterion of being existent.” (Arnold, 
2012:13) Hence, to be existent is to be causally effective and momentary and to be 
non-existent is otherwise, which seems to entail epistemological equality. However, 
according to Dharmakirti, there is no proof of nonexistence by reason of another 
existence even though non-cognition can be proved by direct perception. 
7
 The 
question on how to relate the correspondence of non-existents and existents remains. 
This brings us to next section.  
 
IV. What is Non-cognition to Dharmakirti ? 
 
The theme of non-cognition seems to be one of the most central notions that 
Dharmakirti primarily works and develops throughout his career. From the account of 
Kamalasila (c. 740-795), however, we discover that the concept of non-cognition was 
not Dharmakirti’s invention. Instead, it was “formulation” of his interlocutors, of 
                                                          
7 Pramanaviniscaya 4.15-23 in Wayman 1999:198-199. 
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which Dharmakirti was said “to find no use” when it comes to applying non-
cognition.” 8  
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According to Dharmakïrti, there are two types of non-cognition, that is, non-cognition 
of perceptible objects, such as a pot, and non-cognition of an imperceptible object, 
such as the remote past or a future event or a ghost. It was the second type of non-
perception that is of interest to us in this study.  
Both of these objects share the feature in obscuring our understanding and 
regarding them as existents. However, it is only in regards to non-cognition of 
perceptible objects, its non-existence can be determined conclusively, without being 
subjected to the principle of causal efficacy, as it is argued above. 
In regards to non-cognition of perceptible objects, Yao (2007) summarizes the 
studies of Kellner (2001, 2003) and Watanabe (2002) as follows: 
 
1. Contrary to his contemporary interlocutors, Dharmakirti neither agrees with the 
Naiyayikas’ accounts of propositional negation nor Isvarasena and Kumarila’s 
illocutionary negation. The first approach reifies absence and reduces “negation to 
perception” while the latter treats non-cognition as an independent epistemic 
knowledge. For Dharmakirti, “negative judgment” is still a judgment and non-
cognition is properly placed in the context of inference as it takes ipso facto 
inferential knowledge to judge; 
2. However, Dharmakirti makes a distinction between non-cognition of perceptible 
object and imperceptible object in establishing non-cognition as valid inference. 
The absence of perceptible object, e.g. absence of pot, is proved when all 
conditions for its imperceptibility are satisfied. On the other hand, the non-
cognition of imperceptible objects, which are super-sensory or abstracts objects, is 
unable to conclusively lead one to determine its existence. The example often 
quoted is that of ghost, of which its non-cognition does not translate into its non-
existence; 
3. The inferential judgment of non-cognition of perceptible objects, in Dharmkirti’s 
view, is built on affirmative perceptions. The inference of “there is no pottery on 
the table” is grounded on “an inferential judgment based on the normal perceptions 
of things other than pottery, e.g. the table etc.” (Yao, 2007,735-736)  
 
In his comparative essay on Dharmakirti’s and Husserl’s views on negative judgment, 
Yao (2005) only limits himself to the discussion of Dharmakirti’s treatment of the 
former type of non-cognition, that is, of perceptible objects/empirical objects. 
Dharmakirti, however, offers his refutations against the fallacy of infinite regress and 
reification as employed by his contemporary interlocutors and “effectively eliminate” 
them as methods to prove the non-existents (Kellner 2015:8). 
Despite this, the topic of how to account for nonexistents from an 
epistemological point of view remains an unending business as it is one of the most 
imperative subjects needs to be addressed in Buddhist philosophy given Buddhism 
deals primarily with the abstract and non-sensory objects in its voluminous 
commentaries and exegesis.  
 
                                                          
 8 Nyayabinduprvapaksasmksipti (On NB-Sva 48) where Kamalasila was quoted as saying: “In 
the case of the inaccessible object (viprakrstavisaya), Dharmakīrti shows that there is no use 
for a ‘non-apprehension,’ which is the opponent’s formulation.” In Wayman 1999:88. 
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V. Dharmakirti’s Skepticism on His Contemporaries’ Explanations of Non-cognition 
of Inaccessible Objects 
 
In respect to ascertaining the inaccessible non-existent object Dharmakirti 
demonstrates that he is clearly skeptical as he thinks the two means of knowledge 
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can’t be used to prove the absence of its being. In Nyayabindu, he remarks:  
 
The non-apprehension of an inaccessible object, having the character of suspending 
direct perception and inference, is a cause for doubt, because there is no proof of 
the absence of an entity when the two authorities (i.e. direct perception and 
inference) are suspended. (Wayman 1999:51) 
 
Kamalasila, testifies that the main purpose of Dharmakirti’s view of nonexistent 
objects is aimed at dealing with the sophistry of his Brahmanic interlocutors. 
9
 This is 
understandable given the discourse of nonexistent objects was not unknown in Indian 
philosophy prior to Dharmakirti. The Mimamsakas, the Indian Materialists, for 
example, made the division of nonexistents into: prior non-existence, posterior non-
existence, mutual non-existence and absolute non-existence (e.g., absence of horn in 
the head of the hare), of which the Sautrantika School, which Dharmakirti belonged 
to, has raised its objections and claims that they are untenable epistemologically (See 
Singh 2007:120-121). 
10
 
This underlying philosophical position has led Dharmakirti to formulate his 
critical views on nonexistents as follows: When there is nothing prove (asatta) due to 
the evidence (linga) of non-apprehension, to say that even though there is absence of 
apprehension, would be a non-ascertainment on account of “endless series” 
(anavasthana). Then, absence of an apprehensible would be devoid of non-
apprehension; likewise, existence (of a thesis) would be absence; to wit, the non-
apprehension by another apprehension is a non-apprehension proved by a direct 
perception. Likewise, is there non-existence by reason of another existence? (We 
respond,): it is not proved. When further, precisely, non-apprehension of such kind is 
the non-existence of non-existents, then even when the objects is proved, due to 
delusion of the subject whem [sic] not ascertaining the conventional language of 
words for the cognition of a non-existent, one is occupied with a symbol for pointing 
out the object. 
11
 
The above translation of Dharmakirti’s direct quote in Pramanaviniscaya may 
sound rather dry while its meaning appears cryptic. Nonetheless, it is one of the most 
important sources found available (in English) to understand Dharmakirti’s view on 
nonexistents. There are at least three succinct yet salient points in regards to non-
cognition of inexistent objects above, which I attempt to paraphrase and interpret 
below: 
1. Let’s evaluate the propositions as follows: 
(1) There is non-cognition of non-existents [D may not agree/doubt] 
(2) There are non-existents (e.g., there are ghosts) [Both D & I* may/may not agree] 
                                                          
9  Nyayabindupurvapaksasmksipti (On NB-Sva 13)  in Wayman 1999:88. 
10 See Singh 2007: 110-124 for the Sauntrantikas’s refutations in the chapter of “Critique of 
Pseudo Methods of Truth.” 
11 From Pramanviniscaya 4.15-23 (Steinkellner, 11*, 16-29) as quoted by Wayman 1999:198-
199. 
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(3) There is no non-existents to prove given there is non-cognition of nonexistents 
(e.g., the existence of ghosts can’t be proven given that we can’t infer whether 
they are existents or not) [D & I* may agree] 
(4) However, there is absence of cognition (e.g., There is a cognition of non being of 
ghosts). [D does not agree] 
Note : D = Dharmakirti, I* = Dharmakirti’s interlocutors 
According to Dharmakirti, premise (4) will lead to an “endless series” or infinite 
regress, when negation of absence turns out to be an affirmation of negative fact and 
this introduces a cognizer to affirm it. It is like saying, “There is no ghost but I see the 
absence of ghost” and this can lead endlessly into “Someone notices ‘I see the 
absence of ghost.’”  
2. In the process of proving the non-apprehension of nothing to be proved, the 
paradox incurs as a non-existent object would have to be established by a valid 
cognition, via inferential knowledge, assumed to be a priori. Nonetheless, the non-
existent, for example, rabbit’s horn or ghosts have the quality of absence or non-
existence. Consequently, there is nothing to be established. If attempts are made to 
cognize such apprehension, due to the fallacy of ad infinitum, the non-cognition itself 
will be meaningless as it is built on an untenable thesis. 
3. For Dharmakirti, “one entity can comprehend (another) entity when there is a 
relation with (its) individual presence; [yet] for an entity unrelated to that (other) there 
is no assurance of not mistaking it [the correspondence/relation].” 12 
4. Moreover, conventional use of linguistic references is not ultimately real, it is 
only supposed to be real. Hence, a fictitious character is just fictitious and has no 
ontological status. If someone analyses the fictitious characters as if they have 
ontological nature, then they are liable to fallacy of reification and might instead 
referring only to the language/symbolic representation rather than the nonexistent 
objects themselves. 
However, given his position of non-cognition of inaccessible objects (“non-
existents”), Dharmakirti seems to admit that the existence of such beings like ghosts, 
horned rabbits, sky flower, etc,” which we do not have access through perception or 
beyond our ordinary experience, are indeterminate as they can neither be affirmed nor 
refuted either until they are challenged by a higher order of epistemological warrant. 
The question that can be put forward to Dharmakirti is how to reconcile the accounts 
for non-existents on conventional level with the references of their existence in 
Buddhist soteriology/exegesis? If we deny them by using the anti-realist approach, 
not only will we be falling into nihilist interpretation but also the whole descriptions 
of Buddhist accounts of rebirth, karmic laws and existences of other worlds that form 
the cradle of Buddhist soteriology would fall into incoherent pieces. I argue that the 
Meinongian theory of non-existents, even though it has its own constraints, would be 
able to supplement a powerful explanatory framework to account for non-existents 
that seems to be lacking in Dharmakirti for reasons explained above.  
 
VI. Studies of Non-existent Objects in Contemporary Philosophy 
 
While non-existents have been known and discussed critically, since the dawn of 
philosophy, with an attitude of either embrace or dismissal, one of the few 
contemporary philosophers in the West who started serious pioneering works on non-
                                                          
12 Nyayabindu in Wayman 1999:47. 
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existents was admittedly Alexius von Meinong (1853-1920). The Austrian’s 
philosophical views were once wrongly misconstrued. That notwithstanding, Bertrand 
Russell, subsequently praised him and “insisted that his work deserved careful study” 
(see Perszyk 1993:1). The following generations of philosophers had found both rich 
and critical resources in his discourse of non-existent objects, even though with some 
modifications.  
In the following pages, I am going to briefly review Meinong’s theory, its 
critique and application in contemporary philosophical studies on the subject. In this 
paper, I am going to limit myself to the Meinongian view rather than to include the 
Neo-Meinongian diverse views. Next, I will summarize Dharmakirti’s and Meinong’s 
treatments on non-existents. I will suggest how Dharmakirti’s suspicion of the 
methodology of deriving non-existents, not without good reason, and lack of 
theoretical discussions on the subject would have been adequately enriched by 
Meinong’s theoretical framework on non-existent objects and solves the paradox he 
initially foresees but stops short of addressing. On the other hand, it would be to 
Meinongians’ advantage to heed Dharmakirti’s counsel on the limitations of non-
cognition qua linguistic and epistemological treatment of non-existents. Dharmakirti’s 
position is quite expected given that his views are partially grounded in Buddhist anti-
realism. 
Meinong fundamentally postulates that there exist “objects which do not have 
being of any kind despite having properties,” labelled as “beingless objects.” These 
beingless objects are found beside the existent objects, like chairs, tables or objects 
that subsist like numbers, geometrical objects. The familiar examples of beingless 
objects are the golden mountain and the round square, which can be both possible and 
impossible. 
13
 In Meinong’s analysis, people often have problem with imagining, 
fantasizing or even fearing objects that do have existence. This is due to the mental 
phenomena which he names as “principle of intentionality,” human’s perpetual 
intentional directedness towards an object, perhaps an obsession with an ontological 
being. As such, Meinong’s position is that there exists an object corresponding to 
each of our mental condition, whether this object is existent or nonexistent. 
14
 
However, Meinong’s main problem that other philosopher takes issue with is his 
apparently paradoxical claim that “There are objects of which it is true that there are 
no such objects.” This definition makes his notion of non-existent not only 
unintelligible but also self-contradictory. Not only Meinong’s definition contradicts 
what Parmenides’ view who claims that it is impossible for us to think an entity that is 
absolute nothing but also to think is to think something. Hence, Meinong’s theory of 
object is not a study of ontology, that is the examination based on “what has being.” 
(Perszyk, 1999, 10) That leads to question whether “the claim of that there are non-
existent objects intended to be a metaphysical or ontological claim.”  
In some of its basic form, the Meinongian accepts statements like “Pegasus is a 
flying horse” and “Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker St” as “true in some other 
world (genuine or fictional/ersatz).” Routley (1980) argues that “all of Meinong’s 
objects are in the object-domain of the actual world, and true unmodalised statements 
can be made about all of them” Perszyk also notices that Meinongian account of 
                                                          
13 Perszyk, 1993:1 for an introduction of Meinongian notion of “Nonexistent Objects” and a 
historical development of Meinong’s philosophy. 
14  See Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy in  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/SEP. 
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truth-in-fiction should be distinct form truth simpliciter (in other words, the logical 
account of consequence) as evidenced from many fictions that their contents are not 
true simpliciter (Perszyk 1993:48-49). Perszyk (1993) also emphasizes that Meinong 
also makes the clear distinction between complete and incomplete objects, redolent of 
knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, “nuclear” and “extra 
nuclear” properties, a discussion I will not venture here due to the economy of space 
and focus. 
However, for illustration of how Meinongian nonexistents, can be applied to 
Dharmakirti inaccessible objects, we start with the basic “principle of property and 
object abstraction” in Zalta (1988), where it can be said that “although flying horse 
does not exist, there is certainly some property that is identical with flying horse.” 
In the following we are going to examine how the Meinongian is going to 
approach the problem of fictional discourse. The nonexistent object in Meinong is 
somewhat very close to its Indian equivalent in Dharmakirti or Indian philosophy. 
Fictional discourse concerns with “fictitious objects” or “nonexistent object.” 
The fictitious objects, which are one of the classes of nonexistent objects, are so 
called as they appear in fictional works, myths or fairy tales, etc. One of the 
commonly known fictitious objects in the Western world is Pegasus besides Hamlet, 
Harry Potter, Hello Kitty, etc. These fictitious objects corresponds to the Indian and 
Buddhist analogies of “horned rabbits, son of a barren woman, sky flower or ghosts” 
also called “inaccessible objects,” which are often quoted for illustrations in 
philosophical discourse.  
An examination of the truth value of Pegasus can be carried out as follows: 
 
(1) Pegasus is a flying horse. 
b (Subject) F (predicate expression)  
Note: b represents “Subject” while F is the notation for “predicate expression.” 
In general, a sentence must fulfil the following principles to make logical sense: 
1. Existential Generalization (EG), i.e. “If b is F, then there is something that is F.” 
Hence, in the above sentence, it can be read as: “If Pegasus is a flying horse, there 
must be something that is flying,” 
2. Predication Principle (PP), i.e. “(PPa) If b is F, then there is something that is 
identical with b or (PPb) If b is F, then b exists. Of which, it can be read as: “If 
Pegasus is a flying horse, there must be something that is identical with Pegasus” 
(PPa) or “If flying horse applies to Pegasus, then Pegasus has to exist” (PPb). 
3. Commonly and reasonably accepted to be true in order to make logical sense.  
The problem comes when the two principles are applied to fictitious objects, in this 
case Pegasus, which is contradictory to empirical facts and ontological status of the 
nonexistent objects, as we shall see, with EG, the sentence above (1) implies 
“There are flying horses” (2) and with PP, it (1) implies “Pegasus exists” (3). Yet, 
Pegasus is a nonexistent fictitious object and can’t exist. 
 
Meinong’s claim that there are nonexistent/impossible objects could therefore 
countenance the statement that fictitious objects do not exist but concurrently 
addresses that there are fictitious objects. To illustrate how a Meinongian solution 
can be applied to avoid contradiction, we can consider the following premises: 
 
(1) Pegasus is a flying horse. 
(2) There are flying horses. (1, EG) 
(3) There are no flying horses  
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Meinong would reject premise ( 3) as false as his theory accepts that “flying horses do 
not exist” but there are flying horses as nonexistent objects, of which Pegasus is 
included. The contradiction in the above will be solved when the sentence in (3) is 
replaced with “Flying horses do not exist” which does not contradict (2). 15 
We can apply the above Meinongian scheme to Dharmakirti’s imperceptible 
objects of “ghosts” by considering the followings: 
 
(1) Ghosts are spirit of a dead person/animal 16 
(2) Ghosts exist. (1, PP) 
(3) Ghosts are fictitious object. 
(4) Fictitious objects do not exist. 
(5) Ghosts don’t exist. (3, 4) 
 
In this case, the Meinongian solution will consist in rejecting premise (2), which 
cannot be accepted, as it is supposed to be a nonexistent object. 
The (1, PP), however, does not necessarily have to be rejected as it can be read in 2 
ways, either: 
 
 (PPa) If b is F, then there is something that is identical with b.  
 (PPb) If b is F, then b exists. 
 
Given that Meinongian only maintains there is something identical with Ghosts (the 
weaker version of PP), although Ghosts do not exist, (PPa) can still be accepted while 
(PPb) rejected. As such the inference from premise 1 that “Ghosts are spirits of a dead 
person/animal” to “Ghosts exist” is blocked. Since the Meinongian accepts only the 
weaker version (PPa) of the predication principle, the inference from premise 1 
(“Pegasus is a flying horse”) to “Pegasus exists” is blocked. All that can be derived 
from premise 1 is the weaker claim “If Ghost is spirit of a dead person/animal, then 
there is something that is identical with ghost.” 
With Meinongian’s framework above, we can come up with is that a logical 
theory to describe  the non-cognition of nonexistent objects without committing to its 
ontological status. 
Problems with Meinongian Nonexistent Objects. 
Russell’s main objection of Meinong’s theory was based on the following: 
 
(1) The proposition behind Meinong’s impossible objects (e.g., The round square 
is round and not round) violates the rule of logic and is contradictory.  
(2) Despite Meinong’s proposition that impossible objects do not exist as Meinong 
claims, the conclusion is still they do not exist. Russell pointed out that Meinong’s 
use of “The so-and-so” references fail to capture the distinction and non-
correspondence between grammatical structure and logical form.  
In reply to Russell, Meinong offered the following defense: 
 
(1) Beingless objects, unlike actual and possible objects, do not follow the law of 
noncontradiction. Based on his principle of characterization, Meinong asserts that 
                                                          
15  I owe the above explanations and examples to the entry of “Nonexistent Objects” in 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/. 
16 Definition as given by Wikipedia’s entry of “ghost” in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghost. 
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the proposition behind the impossible object of “the round square is round and not-
round” does not mean: “the round square is round” and “It’s not the case the round 
square is round.” In other words, the negation of “A is non-B” is equivalent to “Not 
(A is B)”. 
(2) In Meinong’s theory, “being existing” is distinct from “existence.” The former 
is a determination of so-being while the latter is a determination of being. “Being 
so,” found in impossible objects, precludes their having possible “being.” The 
“being so” is also not equivalent to “being” in possible world. Russell apparently 
dismisses such a distinction. 
 
Having gone through Meinong’s and Russell’s view on nonexistents above, I outlines 
the following salient points as a conclusion between Dharmakirti’s and Meinong’s 
views on nonexistents: 
 
(1) Both Dharmakirti and Meinong would agree that our cognition covers a whole 
lot of objects, including non-existent objects, 
(2) Both agree that what can be known about objects, whether perceptible or 
imperceptible objects, are a priori. 
(3) Despite his skepticism about the methodology of deriving non-cognition of 
nonexistents, Dharmakirti does not deny or affirm the existence of 
imperceptible/nonexistent objects. His attitude is indeterminate given the 
methodological limitations that he outlines. 
(4) Dharmakirti, however, thinks that the cognition of non-cognition of 
nonexistents is to be carried out through inferential activity and since the 
knowledge of it is a priori, he does not need to postulate a separate means of 
knowledge to account for them and hence runs into the fallacy of infinite regress. 
(5) Meinong also acknowledges that his Theory of Object is based on a priori 
science, i.e., concerns all given phenomena and notices the tension of it with 
metaphysics which involves with investigation of empirical phenomena/ general 
reality.  
(6) Meinong asserts that “So-being” the determinant of “being existing” is distinct 
from “being” which is a “determinant of existence.” “So-being” (or “Being so”) is 
found in impossible objects that disqualifies their possibility of “being.” The “being 
so” is also not equivalent to “being” in possible world. I think Dharmakirti could 
possibly concur with this proposition of Meinong given that his mode of correct 
reasoning is based on the tenet that “existence only in the similar locus and 
exclusion everywhere in the dissimilar locus.” 
 
Conclusion 
 
Dharmakirti’s dismissal of non-cognition of imperceptible objects seems to have 
missed out a fair share of explanatory accounts on this group of objects although they 
form an essential part of Buddhist philosophical/soteriological discourse. 
Dharmakirti’s trivial attention to non-cognition of them is not without reason. For 
Dharmakirti, nonexistents are not determinable in regards to their existential status. 
The three reasons, he gave for considerations, which I have elaborated above, are 
based on his analysis that accounts of nonexistents qua non-cognition are liable for 
falling into the fallacies of infinite regress and reification. However, Dharmakirti 
faces a dilemma in between accounting for nonexistents without resorting to another 
means of valid cognition, which he was reluctant to do due to its obvious 
shortcomings and accounting them but through reliance on another means of valid 
cognition in doctrinal inference. By choosing the later strategy, Dharmakirti clearly 
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shows that given the tension between epistemology that he has devoted himself 
throughout his career and commitment to doctrinal truth, he would prefer to rely on 
the later when it comes to things neither cognizable to direct perception nor inference. 
This, however, has allegedly made him subscribe to the fallibilist argument. Meinong, 
on the other, affirms “that whatever can be experienced in some way, i.e. be the target 
of a mental act, called an object, are existent. Meinong’s all-embracing theory of 
objects covers all kinds of non-existents, such as non-beings, impossible objects, 
paradoxical and defective objects. These include even self-referential thinking (e.g., 
the thought about itself), which plays a central role in Dharmakirti’s epistemology 
and often referred to self-cognition. Meinong’s attempt is to offer rational accounts to 
the paradox of nonexistence.  
As I have demonstrated above through the application of Meinongian to account 
for the Dharmakirtian notion of “ghosts,” a rational account can be possible without 
committing to its ontology. Even though such naïve account may be liable to the 
methodological constraint that Dharmakirti cited, I think it is worthwhile attempting 
as any rational account will be benefitting the development of Buddhist philosophy. 
Furthermore, such endeavors can be done be within the context of Buddhist cardinal 
understanding of conventional/ultimate truth. Finally, my attempt in this paper is a 
first step in applying Meinongian theory to understand Buddhist epistemologist and 
logician’s position on nonexistents. In the course of writing, it dawns on me that there 
are ample of research opportunities in this field of study which are open to whoever 
interested to pursue them. 
One final word is that it is often forgotten that the ultimate concern for 
Dharmakirti and followers is not philosophical elaboration per se in pursuing 
Buddhist logic. Rather, it is what it means to be human and how to go beyond this 
unsatisfactoriness-bound existence. It is a concern steeped in soteriological value that 
is grounded in humanist compassion to liberate all sentient beings. For Dharmakirti, 
the answer is to be found in the self-cognition of ultimate reality or in other words, 
awareness of things beyond oneself, however imperceptible they at the moment. 
17
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